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DE-CANTING ‘TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS’, RE-CENTRING THE STATE 
Abstract 
Contemporary liberal states are eager to combat ‘human trafficking’, which state 
actors describe as ‘the scourge of modern slavery’ and a violation of human rights. 
The same states are also depriving migrants of their freedom on an unprecedented 
scale through immigration detention, forcibly moving them across borders through 
deportation, and sustaining a flourishing industry in the prevention and control of 
human movement. This is not a paradox. The ambition to eradicate ‘slavery’, as 
much as the desire to severely restrict freedom of movement, reflects a concern to 
preserve and extend state powers, in particular its monopoly on violence and on the 
control of mobility. 
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DE-CANTING ‘TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS’, RE-CENTRING THE STATE 
Dictionary definitions of the English verb ‘to traffic’ identify a number of different, 
though related meanings. It can signify an act of commercial exchange, or the 
passage of people, vehicles, cargo, data or communication along routes of 
transportation or systems of communication, and is thought to link etymologically to 
the Old Italian ‘trafficare’, to trade, and/or the Catalan ‘trafegar’, to decant. Unlike 
terms such as ‘murder’, ‘rape’, ‘kidnap’, ‘cheat’ or ‘steal’, the term ‘trafficking’ does 
not by definition refer to a form of action deemed morally wrong, then. In fact, it 
references activities (movement, trade, communication) that are in general regarded 
as crucial to social and economic life. By contrast, the term ‘trafficking in human 
beings’, hereafter THB, is today evocative of a profound threat both to the 
individuals it affects, and to the social and economic order. Politicians and 
governmental organisations routinely claim that ‘THB’ is significant human rights 
violation and a hugely profitable business in which organised criminals transport 
millions of human victims around the globe for purposes of exploitation. It is 
described as a trade that reduces human beings to mere objects and as a form of 
slavery, and political leaders repeatedly compare ‘THB’ to the transatlantic slave 
trade (O’Connell Davidson, 2015; Bravo, 2011).  Announcing her intention to 
introduce a Modern Slavery Bill aimed at strengthening existing anti-trafficking law 
and eradicating an ‘evil in our midst’, for example, British Home Secretary, Theresa 
May (2013) observed that ‘the slave trade was not really abolished; it just changed 
its form. People are still bought and sold in coffee bars at Heathrow airport, then 
sent to work in Norwich farms and Soho nail bars.’  
Framed as a form of ‘modern slavery’, calls to combat ‘THB’ have great emotional 
and moral leverage and attract almost universal support. And yet the liberal 
democratic states that are so eager to combat ‘the scourge of modern slavery’ in the 
form of ‘THB’ are equally if not more enthusiastically engaged in depriving many 
groups of migrants of their freedom through (often for-profit) immigration 
detention, denying them basic rights, forcibly moving them across borders through 
 2 
deportation, and sustaining a flourishing industry in the prevention and control of 
human mobility. In other words, whilst seeking to suppress one form of traffic (THB) 
on grounds that it leads to restrictions on human freedom, liberal states sanction 
other forms of movement and trade, or traffic, that produce precisely the same 
effects. This article explores that paradox, arguing that states’ interest in combatting 
‘the scourge of modern slavery’ in the form of ‘THB’ is born of a concern to preserve 
and extend state powers, and not an impulse to acknowledge and protect all humans 
as persons of equal moral worth.  
The Evil of Trafficking: First Apparition  
From the mid-eighteenth century, the original anti-slavery movement sought to 
transform popular perceptions of a form of traffic that had for centuries been 
regarded as either normal and justifiable, or inevitable and unavoidable – namely, 
the slave trade. The success of that movement was such that by the end of the 
nineteenth century, most Europeans considered the movement and trading of 
human beings as chattel slaves to be a great evil. So complete was the volte face that 
European colonial ventures in Africa were now sometimes explicitly justified on 
grounds that colonial rule would cleanse the ‘dark continent’ of barbaric practices 
such as slavery and slave trading (even King Leopold II’s murderous regime in the 
Congo was initially authorized as a humanitarian and philanthropic intervention) 
(Quirk, 2011).  
Both the abolition of slavery in existing colonies, and colonial expansion elsewhere, 
involved vast displacements of people and, alongside other economic developments 
including many massive construction projects, set in train new forms and systems of 
mobility in the nineteenth century. This included the ‘coolie system’ of indentured 
labour with which the European powers replaced slave labour in their plantation 
economies and powered the expansion of extractive industries and construction 
projects (Cohen, 2006; Kempadoo et al, 2005; Sharma, 2006; Andrijasevic, 2010). 
Again, there was traffic both in the sense that people were being ‘decanted’ along 
routes of transportation, and in the sense that their passage involved acts of 
commercial exchange (as well as being vital to the global economy). Again, such 
traffic was not immediately or automatically considered immoral, but was 
authorized and regulated by the state. Neither those who employed indentured 
labourers, nor the shipping companies, recruitment agencies, money-lenders, and 
others involved in the state sanctioned trade of moving them were regarded as 
inherently evil, and this despite the fact that mortality rates on the ships 
transporting workers from India to the West Indies averaged over 17 per cent in 
1856, and living and working conditions on plantations closely resembled those 
previously experienced by slaves (Cohen, 2006: 20).  
However, some forms of movement were singled out for special concern in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, namely those that involved the 
independent mobility of people generally imagined as dependent and unfit for full 
civil freedom (either on grounds of their race or their gender). In this period, the 
movement of Indian and Chinese people within the British Empire but outside the 
coolie system, which is to say, migration undertaken independently of state or 
employer, was a source of intense concern in white settler colonies such as Australia, 
Canada, and Natal, as well as in Britain itself (Lake, 2015; Mongia, 1999; Anderson, 
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2013; Sharma, 2006). The migration of European and North American women and 
girls to work in prostitution in East Asia and South America and/or take up other 
economic opportunities afforded by the large-scale male migrations occurring at that 
time was also a source of alarm. In Europe and North America, the latter became the 
focus of ‘a racialized social panic about the “White Slave Trade”’ (Kempadoo et al, 
2005: x; Chapkis 1997; Doezema 1999; Bartley, 2000), a panic that ultimately fed into 
the production of the 1949 United Nations Convention on the Suppression of 
Trafficking in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others. The 
discourse of White Slavery lifted a particular kind of movement and trade (the 
passage of white women and girls into prostitution) from other, socially sanctioned 
forms of traffic, and moralized and racialized it. The problem with this ‘traffic’ was 
not that it produced chattel slaves, or even rightless and exploited workers. Its evil 
was threefold - evil because it channelled white women and children, who belonged 
at home, into a market; evil because it did so without state sanction; and evil 
because the market into which this traffic decanted them was deemed immoral in 
itself – prostitution.  
The Evil of Trafficking: Second Apparition  
The idea of ‘THB’ as a specific evil, distinct from more ordinary forms of movement 
and trade, resurfaced at the end of the twentieth century, again in a context of rapid 
changes to an established global economic and political order. By the 1990s, the 
post-war social democratic consensus that had licensed state interventions in the 
market mechanisms of capitalist societies in order to protect the human worth of 
(some) worker citizens was breaking down. Those pressing to extend market forces, 
both globally and within nations, were reclaiming political ground. Neoliberal 
economic restructuring gathered pace in the 1990s, a trend that was both allowed 
by and has allowed for processes of deindustrialization in the global North and the 
expansion of manufacturing sectors in the global South. Forms of traffic that had 
formerly been sanctioned but closely controlled by the state were now being 
deregulated (Harvey, 2007).  
At the same time, the Berlin wall had been torn down and many Communist regimes 
had crumbled. During the Cold War period, the close control that Communist states 
exercised over the mobility of their citizens was considered an especially troubling 
violation of human rights, but the more porous borders that resulted from the 
removal of such control sparked political anxiety in Western liberal societies. Freer 
movement was perceived as a potential threat to their legitimate economies and 
political institutions, and indeed to national sovereignty and security. ‘THB’ re-
entered policy consciousness through the lens of these disquiets. Initially, media and 
policy attention continued the discourse of ‘White Slavery’ with a strong focus on 
cases in which women and girls were forced into prostitution. This provided the basis 
for strong alliances between governmental actors in states that already adopted a 
prohibitionist stance on prostitution (especially the US and Sweden) and religious 
and feminist activists and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) lobbying the 
suppression of prostitution, such that one strand of ‘anti-trafficking’ policy and 
advocacy has taken the form of what Ron Weitzer (2007) describes as a ‘moral 
crusade’ against the sex industry.  
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The influence of such crusaders is visible in the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000), 
which continues the historical framing of ‘human trafficking’ as a threefold wrong 
entailing the movement of women and children (now brown and black, as well as 
white) from the private domestic realm, without state sanction, into an iniquitous or 
injurious market. Hence, the Protocol definition of ‘trafficking’ expressly singles out 
prostitution (as opposed to say, domestic or construction work) for mention as a 
potential site of coerced labour, and the Protocol as a whole is especially concerned 
to suppress, prevent and punish ‘trafficking’ in women and children. As a result, 
‘anti-trafficking’ policies in many regions have continued and/or extended a longer 
history of state control over the mobility and sexuality of ‘masterless’ women and/or 
children (Kapur, 2013; Hashim and Thronsen, 2010; O’Connell Davidson, 2011).  
However, Western governments were not always or merely concerned to suppress 
prostitution, but rather viewed ‘THB’ as part of a much wider problem of 
‘transnational organised crime’ involving an array of illegal markets and forms of 
movement. ‘THB’ was thus parcelled up with phenomena such as people smuggling, 
money laundering, and drug and gun running, and addressed within the United 
Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (2000), and its three 
additional protocols (the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea 
and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, as well as the Trafficking 
Protocol). It was, however, extremely loosely defined, not least because the many 
different state and civil society representatives involved in negotiations did not share 
a common understanding of where and how to draw the line between ‘normal’ and 
‘evil’ forms of movement and trade (Doezema, 2010). Consensus was finally 
achieved at the expense of precision. The UN Protocol defines ‘trafficking’ not as a 
single, one-off event, but a coercive process that takes place over time (recruitment, 
transportation and control) and that is organised – in a variety of different ways - for 
purposes of exploitation. i  
Where the discourse of White Slavery separated the passage of white women and 
girls into prostitution from other, socially sanctioned forms of traffic, the Trafficking 
Protocol is concerned with the passage of people into any exploitative arrangement. 
But as ‘exploitation’ is undefined, and the nature and degree of force that will 
constitute ‘coercion’ unspecified, ‘trafficking’ is a moveable feast even in cases 
involving women’s movement into sex work (O’Connell Davidson, 2006; Plambech, 
2014). The vague and expansive definition also muddies the line between ‘THB’ and 
what states categorise as other forms of movement, including ‘smuggling’ and 
‘asylum seeking’ (Anderson and O’Connell Davidson, 2003). As will be argued below 
through a focus on the fuzzy boundary between ‘THB’ and ‘people smuggling’, this 
has opened the door for a discourse in which the movement of people across 
borders without state sanction is, per se, moralized as ‘evil’, and the vast and deadly 
business of preventing free movement legitimated as necessary, or even ‘good’. 
People Smuggling, Human Trafficking, and the State-Sanctioned Traffic in 
Preventing ‘Illegal Immigration’ 
Since the 1990s, dwindling opportunities for legally authorized international 
migration has prompted the expansion and diversification of markets for clandestine 
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migration services (Kempadoo et al, 2005; Alpes, 2011). In policy documents, such 
markets are conceptualized as either ‘trafficking’ or ‘smuggling’, with two main sets 
of differences between them repeatedly asserted. The first is temporal. Relations 
between smuggler and smuggled are said to end on arrival at the point of 
destination, whereas the trafficker continues to exercise control over the trafficked 
person. Smuggling and trafficking are imagined as processes that may overlap in 
initial stages of movement, but that become clearly differentiated at the point of 
destination. The second distinction is said to be that where trafficking ‘is carried out 
with the use of coercion and/or deception’, smuggling is ‘a voluntary act on the part 
of those smuggled’ (Home Office, 2013a; US State Department, 2006).  
In practice, however, the smuggling/trafficking and voluntary/forced migration dyads 
cannot accommodate the complicated realities of the systems and processes that 
facilitate regular and irregular migration in the real world, nor do they recognise the 
complexity and variety of social relations between migrants and those who benefit 
directly or indirectly from their exploitation (see, for example, Andersson, 2014a; 
Anderson, 2013; Andrijasevic, 2010; Testai, 2008). For instance, debt is often 
presented as one of the key mechanisms by which ‘trafficked’ persons are enslaved. 
According to the UK Home Office (2013b: 3), ‘In many instances traffickers will 
increase the control they have over individuals by placing them in debt bondage, 
making them work to pay off the money they owe the trafficker’. And yet 
indebtedness is a routine feature of migrant experience, and debt to relatives or 
money-lenders or recruiters back home, as much as to an employer at the point of 
destination, is a factor known to lock both ‘smuggled persons’ and migrants who 
move through legally sanctioned systems of labour migration into violent and 
exploitative employment relations (O’Connell Davidson, 2013; Huong, 2010; ILO, 
2011). In fact, it is precisely states’ efforts to control and restrict migration that push 
significant numbers of would-be migrants into the relations of debt and dependency 
within which they can become vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. This is so 
whether the migrants concerned would be classified by states as ‘temporary labour 
migrants’, or ‘asylum seekers’.   
In this and many other ways, the trafficking/smuggling, forced/voluntary dyads 
collapse what are actually a series of complex and overlapping continuums into a 
simple either/or choice (Anderson and O’Connell Davidson, 2003; Anderson and 
Rogaly, 2005). It is also notable that these binaries rest on an extremely narrow and 
particular understanding of what constitutes a ‘coercive’ pressure. What Marx 
(1959) described as the dull compulsion of economic relations does not feature in 
the list of forces deemed to nullify a person’s consent to exploitation in the UN 
Trafficking Protocol, even though being unable to feed one’s self or one’s children, or 
to pay for medical treatment for sick dependants, or to repay debts to relatives or 
money lenders, may operate as just as an irresistible force as the threat of physical 
violence (Steinfeld, 2001).  
The terms ‘human smuggling’ and ‘human trafficking’ do not describe two 
ethnographically distinct forms of movement, then. And whilst in theory, the former 
is imagined as a problem because it violates immigration law, the latter because it 
violates the human rights of the victim, both can be, and are represented as part of a 
wider threat to the security and values of modern liberal democracies in an 
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increasingly globalised world. As US Secretary of State John Kerry recently put it: 
‘Combatting human trafficking is both a moral imperative and a national security 
issue’ (Morse, 2014). As such, it is readily subsumed into the more general project of 
preventing unauthorized movement, or ‘cracking down on illegal migration’. This is a 
project that has led to an expansion of state powers with regard to the traffic of 
people, vehicles, and cargo along routes of transportation more generally. In the EU 
in the 1990s, for instance, states introduced ‘sanctions against carriers transporting 
passengers without the proper documents’ (Samers, 2003: 563), sanctions that were 
strengthened and harmonised within the EU from 2005 (Duvell and Vollmer, 2011: 
9). In Europe, North America and Australia in particular, surveillance of people, 
vehicles and cargo has also been massively intensified, in fact, a whole new traffic 
has been developed to meet states’ growing desire to control their borders – what 
Ruben Andersson (2014a) terms ‘the business of illegal immigration’.  
In the US and Europe, states have spent vast amounts of money on erecting barriers 
to movement. The global market for land and maritime border management was 
worth around 29.33 billion USD in 2012, with the highest expenditure in North 
America, and ‘The scale of the market for border security is expanding in Europe and 
the world, with total growth expected to exceed 56.52 billion USD for land and 
maritime borders by 2022’ (Baird, 2015). While some of this money is spent on the 
construction and maintenance of traditional methods of exclusion – walls, fences, 
razor wire, check-points, sentries and guards - the measures employed to suppress 
unauthorized forms of border crossing have become increasingly high-tech. States 
also now provide demand for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, which are 
used to monitor borders, ‘providing aerial surveillance support for border agents by 
investigating sensor activity in remote areas… allowing the boots on the ground 
force to best allocate their resources and efforts’ (Unmanned, 2012). In the 2000s, 
the EU invested in new surveillance systems, such as SIVE (sistema integrado de 
vigilancia exterior) that ‘combines radar, high-tech cameras, and patrols’ (Andersson, 
2014a: 85), to monitor southern Europe’s coastlines, along with x-ray technology 
used to scan commercial trucks at ports ‘to detect carbon dioxide and heart beats, 
thus indicating the presence of migrants’ (Albahari, 2006: 10).  
From the 2000s, the European Union also began externalizing its ‘immigration 
control and Schengen border enforcement to “gatekeepers” and “buffer states” 
through bilateral agreements, visa regimes, carrier sanctions, military training, and 
the establishment of migration detention facilities’ (Albahari, 2006: 20). This was a 
new transnational traffic in which EU member states used their political and 
economic power to encourage and pay their non-EU neighbours (especially North 
and West African states) to undertake certain control functions on their behalf. The 
functions subcontracted out to countries with extremely dubious human rights 
records, such as Libya both under Ghaddafi and today, include migrant-holding and 
‘processessing’ (HRW, 2014; Andrijasevic, 2006). The new technologies of 
surveillance have been extended and ‘transnational policing networks’ expanded. 
One such high-tech venture ‘around the figure of the illegal immigrant’ funded by 
the EU, the Seahorse Project, ‘had by 2010 pulled in Spain, Portugal, Mauritania, 
Cape Verde, Senegal, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Morocco’ (Andersson, 2014a: 
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82). Within all this, lucrative opportunities for consultants offering training and 
evaluation services have burgeoned.  
All in all, trade has been and continues to be brisk for the private defense, security, 
construction and new technology companies that support states’ efforts to 
immobilize the people whose presence on their territory is deemed undesirable. This 
is a traffic that is not only authorized by states, but that exists to serve them. Yet it is 
also a traffic that has lethal consequences. The IOM (2014) recently issued a report 
estimating that more than 40,000 migrants had died between 2000 and 2013 in the 
course of ‘irregular’ movement, nearly 6,000 along the US-Mexico border (see also 
O’Leary, 2008), and 22,000 on the borders of the EU, mostly in the Mediterranean. 
Between 1993 and 2012, the organisation UNITED for Intercultural Action 
documented 17,306 deaths of refugees and migrants attributable ‘to border 
militarisation, asylum laws, detention policies, deportations and carrier sanctions’ in 
Europe (UNITED, 2012); between 2000 and 2014, the Australian Border Deaths 
Database recorded 1,969 deaths at the Australian frontier (Border Crossing 
Observatory, 2015). In October 2014, the British Government announced that the UK 
would no longer contribute to search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean. 
Its spokespeople defended the move as necessary to deter ‘illegal’ migrants from 
embarking on treacherous voyages, a proposition, Andersson (2014b) commented, 
‘as absurd as removing seatbelts in cars to make drivers more risk-averse… Maritime 
“migration management” now reeks with the politics of death’.  
In the context of this deathly stench, the discourse on ‘trafficking as modern slavery’ 
has taken on morally cleansing properties, for if ‘THB’ is ‘slavery’, then it stands 
outside migration as a self-evident and absolute wrong. The trade in moving people, 
without state sanction, out of their proper place (in their own nation) becomes evil 
in and of itself. ‘Smuggling’ and ‘trafficking’ then become interchangeable terms for 
the ‘slave trade’, such that even those who illegally facilitate the mobility of people 
who want to move, including those fleeing war, persecution, and other threats to life 
itself, become legitimate targets of state violence.  
Consider, for example, political and media reaction to the staggering loss of life 
amongst those seeking to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean from Libya in 
the spring of 2015 (estimated to be more than 2000 deaths by August, Globalpost, 
2015). First, we should note that travelling from North Africa to Europe is not 
intrinsically dangerous or even expensive. Budget airlines offer flights from Morocco 
to Marseilles and Berlin at around 30 Euros. The people who make the perilous sea 
crossing on flimsy vessels do so because the EU immigration regime prevents them 
from accessing this safe route. Next it is worth noting that one of the key reasons 
why Libya became a crossing site for such large numbers of people in recent years 
was precisely because Morocco had, with encouragement from the EU, set in place 
new immigration legislation which included sanctions against ‘THB’, smuggling and 
irregular stay, and had increasingly employed the means to enforce these. The 
criminalization of mobility here in effect ‘decanted’ many of those who urgently 
wanted and needed to move towards Libya (Stock, 2015).  
Notwithstanding this, responsibility for the many thousands of deaths was 
repeatedly laid at the feet of ‘people traffickers’ in political and media discourse. EU 
leaders vowed to use their military might to ‘identify, capture and destroy’ the 
 8 
vessels used to transport people, even knowing that ‘collateral damage’ in the form 
of loss of life might result (Traynor, 2015). There is a wealth of evidence to show 
that, unlike those who were kidnapped, held in dungeons, then shackled and 
transported from Africa to slavery in the New World, the men, women and children 
today waiting to make the Mediterranean crossing actively and urgently wish to get 
to Europe and have compelling reasons for wishing to do so. And yet the militarized 
response was presented as a ‘tough choice’ forced upon EU leaders by the 
resurgence of a more terrible evil. As Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi (2015) put 
it, “Human traffickers are the slave traders of the 21st century, and they should be 
brought to justice”.  
The project of preventing unauthorized migration is fundamentally incompatible 
with that of protecting and promoting human rights, and this is so even where 
concern is limited to a small number of groups whose particular ‘vulnerabilities’ are 
recognized as entitling them to special protection – namely, ‘VoTs’, children, and 
asylum seekers. At the point of departure, the so-called ‘smuggled’ and the so-called 
‘trafficked’ all want to move, and they include amongst their number children and 
people fleeing persecution and seeking refuge on grounds that are deemed 
legitimate in relevant international law. The current border regime operates 
indiscriminately on all these groups. Those who are children, asylum seekers, and 
‘potential victims of trafficking’ (and one person may be all three), as well as those 
who are not, drown in the Mediterranean, suffocate in lorries, are blown apart by 
landmines, fall under the trains to which they cling, and die of thirst in deserts. Their 
deaths are not the result of acts of private individuals operating a slave trade similar 
to the transatlantic trade, but rather a consequence of the powers claimed by 
contemporary states over human mobility, and the authorized forms of traffic set in 
motion to exert those powers.  
Dominant discourse on ‘THB’ also disregards other ways in which the state is 
implicated in traffic that harms large numbers of human beings. 
Immigration Detention and Trafficking 
Immigration detention refers to ‘the deprivation of liberty of non-citizens under 
aliens’ legislation because of their status’, and though not new, it is today being used 
on an unprecedented scale (Grant, 2011: 69; Loyd et al, 2013). Immigration 
detainees live under the potentially and actually violent control of those who hold 
them. In Canada, for example, they ‘are held in secure facilities with surveillance 
cameras, guards and metal detectors… Prohibitive rules abound… Shackles, 
handcuffs, and leg irons are standard protocol for transportation’ (Walia and Tagore, 
2012: 76). That immigration detainees are vulnerable to physical violence as well as 
to sexual and racial abuse at the hands of their captors in the UK, the US, Canada, 
and Australia, as well as elsewhere in the world, is now well documented 
(Townsend, 2013; Doherty, 2015a and b; HRW, 2010). Human beings held in 
immigration detention have fewer rights and protections in law than do citizens 
detained for criminal offences (Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Kaiser and Stannow, 
2011). They are frequently held in remote and isolated locations, and just as one of 
the horrors of the system of transatlantic slavery was the wrenching apart of 
families, so immigration detention (also the practices of deportation) routinely 
destroy family life (Mountz, 2012; Rosas, 2012; Golash-Boza, 2012). 
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Within the vast industry built around the illegalization of particular forms of 
movement, depriving non-citizens of their liberty is an activity that generates 
significant profits for the many private companies involved in the provision of 
‘security’ services and the construction and management of immigration detention 
centres. Immigration detention is an important segment of the ‘prison industrial 
complex’, and in the US alone, migrants’ rights organisations estimate that it 
generates profits of $5 billion per year (Cuentame, 2013). In the UK too, the 
management of detention centres (as well as prisons) is increasingly being 
outsourced to global private security companies. Indeed, G4S, SERCO, Sodexo, and 
other private security firms have come to dominate detention, transport and escort 
services for irregular migrants and asylum seekers (and in 2010, 773 complaints were 
lodged against G4S by immigration detainees including forty-eight claims of assault) 
(Grayson, 2012). Without bodies to hold and process, there would be no profit for 
these private companies to secure, and since immigration detainees function as the 
raw materials of this ‘labour process’, they are arguably subject to ‘economic 
exploitation’.  
Some immigration detainees are, in addition, subject to labour exploitation. In 
Britain, migrants whose immigration status denies them any and all access to the 
labour market, and who may in fact end up in detention because they have not 
complied with this rule, can – once detained - ‘be paid to work in the detention 
centre that is holding them’ (Anderson, 2013: 78). They serve food, clean and 
launder, paint rooms, and generally contribute to ‘the provision of services internal 
to the detention centre, most of which are managed by large corporations’, and pay 
rates are either £1.00 per hour, for routine work, or £1.25 for specified projects 
(Anderson, 2013: 78). A 2014 Corporate Watch report suggests that employing 
detainees at these well below minimum wage rates, Serco, G4S, Mitie and GEO could 
have saved themselves more than £2.8 million (Rawlinson, 2014). Similarly in the US, 
it is reported that the use of immigration detainees’ labour ‘saves the government 
and the private companies $40 million or more a year by allowing them to avoid 
paying outside contractors the $7.25 federal minimum wage’. Some detainees are 
paid 13 cents an hour, others ‘held at county jails work for free, or are paid with 
sodas or candy bars, while also providing services like meal preparation for other 
government institutions’ (Urbina, 2014).  
Immigration detainees are people moved against their will into a situation in which 
they are controlled by means of violence or its threat, and exploited for economic 
gain. This sounds very much like what is described as ‘THB’ when perpetrated 
without the sanction of the state. But it goes unquestioned in dominant discourse on 
‘THB’. Even anti-trafficking activists who approach the issue through a concern with 
human, women’s, children’s or labour rights generally fail to comment on the 
parallels between the traffic by means of which states attempt to secure their 
borders, and the activities described as the ‘evil of human trafficking’. In fact, there 
are even antislavery campaigners who call for tougher border controls on grounds 
that such measures will lead to the apprehension of ‘traffickers’ and so help to end 
the ‘slave trade’ (Bales, 1999).ii  
‘THB’ and the State 
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In his review of the extent and significance of debt slavery, Alain Testart (2002: 193) 
observes that in Western tradition from Solon to Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice, 
debt slavery has been regarded as a hateful practice amounting to the oppression of 
the poor. ‘But what exactly,’ he asks, ‘ is hateful in it?’ and continues: 
Not that there are poor people, because inequality of wealth is not what 
arouses indignation, but that a person should be put into bondage because of 
his or her poverty… What is scandalous in debt slavery is the oppression of 
poor or weak persons within a community, the oppression of those who are 
close, if not the closest: a relative. 
He then argues that states have an interest in limiting or abolishing such bondage 
because: 
A king’s subject, a citizen of the polis, is neither subject nor citizen if he 
becomes a slave. A slave has but one master. He pays no taxes, and owes no 
military service. Every time a freeman was taken into slavery, the political 
powers-that-be lost a source of fiscal revenue and a soldier (2002:197). 
Moreover, what the state lost, another gained. Debt slavery equipped rich 
individuals with power over their slaves and influence over others wishing to avoid 
debt slavery. Multiple nubs of power emerged, threatening the central power of the 
state.  
This analysis helps to explain the contemporary interest expressed by state actors in 
combatting ‘THB’, which they describe as a phenomenon by which the poor and the 
weak are forced into a condition of ‘modern slavery’ (often by means of debt-
bondage). What is hateful about this to the liberal democratic state is, again, clearly 
not its foundation in poverty or global inequality. The people Theresa May describes 
as sent to work ‘in Norwich farms and Soho nail bars’ are the poor of other 
countries, many of whom are under compulsion from the debt relations they have 
entered into. But it is not their poverty that is seen as abominable – indeed, Mrs May 
urgently wishes to send them home to it. Nor is it the exploitation of workers who 
are unable to walk away from an employer without facing serious repercussions, 
because the visa and work permit schemes that form part of the immigration 
systems operated by liberal states are designed to prevent migrant workers from 
moving freely in the labour market (Anderson, 2013; Sharma, 2006). And what is 
hateful cannot be the idea that any human being, under any circumstance, should be 
moved or held against their will, or placed in a condition of potentially violent 
control, or subject to economic exploitation, because all of this is considered 
acceptable in the case of immigration detention.  
Despite all the cant about ‘THB’ as a human rights violation, states have defined it as 
first and foremost a security and criminal justice issue, and even international 
organizations that emphasize the need to protect the human rights of ‘VoTs’ often 
lay equal stress on the threat trafficking poses to the central power. In the 
contemporary context of cross-border ‘trafficking’, those who are oppressed and 
exploited are foreigners, not relatives or citizens. But they are controlled and 
exploited on the territory of the liberal democratic state by private individuals (also 
generally imagined as organised foreign criminals), whose power and influence is 
thereby enhanced, who pay no taxes, owe no loyalty to the state, and may even 
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destroy it if their power and influence extends sufficiently. This is the ‘scourge’ that 
states have been motivated to combat, not primarily with a view to eradicating 
exploitation, violence, suffering or restraints on freedom of movement or choice, but 
with a view to shoring up their own monopoly over both violence and the control of 
mobility. Certainly their interest in ‘THB’ does not reflect a wish to recognise all 
human beings on their territory as morally equal ‘persons’.  
Conclusion 
Liberalism has proceeded, Losurdo (2011) argues, by constructing the ‘community of 
the free’ as a space wherein liberal liberties are sacrosanct. Initially, this space was 
open only to propertied white men who sought emancipation from the arbitrary 
authority of monarch or state, and claimed, among other things, the liberty to own 
and manage their property – including slaves, servants, wives, and children – as they 
saw fit. The Others, relegated to the ‘profane’ space beyond this community, had to 
engage in long and painful struggles for inclusion, for there is no spontaneous 
tendency within liberal societies to gradually extend rights to all alike. Following the 
abolition of slavery as a legal status in liberal societies, vigorous moral condemnation 
of slavery co-existed with the continued imposition of extensive, forcible restrictions 
on individuals deemed to be ‘free’ but also lacking the attributes and qualities that 
would equip them for equality and citizenship. Hence the legislation and legal 
judgements in the US following abolition that worked to ensure freed black slaves 
and their descendants remained outside ‘the community of the free’ and the 
substitution of coolie for slave labour in the colonies; hence too the construction of 
modern immigration regimes designed to allow a state sanctioned traffic in the 
labour-power of migrant workers but at the same time prevent those workers from 
accessing the rights and protections formally assured to worker citizens, and to 
prevent the unauthorized entry of unwanted ‘types’ of migrant (the poor, the racially 
‘undesirable’, the ‘unproductive’). 
To be human has never, and still does not, automatically imply recognition as a 
morally equal ‘person’ in liberal societies (Mills, 2015). But at the same time, the 
condition of slavery has not automatically implied complete disqualification as 
‘human’. Slaves in the Americas, for example, were recognised as persons to the 
extent they were deemed legally culpable for criminal acts in a way that non-human 
animals were not (Patterson, 1982; Dayan, 2011; O’Connell Davidson, 2015). 
Contemporary discourse on ‘trafficking’ and ‘modern slavery’ obscures this ‘striking 
contradiction of chattel slavery’, namely, ‘the captive’s bifurcated existence as both 
an object of property and a person’ (Hartman, 1997: 5). It therefore also misses 
important continuities in terms of ways that liberal states simultaneously recognise 
the humanity and individuality of certain ‘categories’ of human being, but exclude 
them from the ‘community of the free’ and construct them as fit for subjection to 
particular forms of exploitation, violence and domination (O’Connell Davidson, 
2015). Today, many groups of migrants, especially irregular migrants, in liberal 
democracies are subject to an ‘exclusion clause’ which leaves them standing outside 
the ‘sacred space wherein the rules of the limitation of power’ obtain (Losurdo, 
2011: 309). In addition to the restrictions placed on immigration detainees discussed 
above, migrants can be subject to deportation, forced destitution, forced separation 
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from children, and denied access to health care, housing, education, justice, welfare 
and work (Anderson, 2013; Madziva, 2010; De Genova, 2002).  
In drawing lines between ‘trafficking’ and ‘smuggling’, between ‘modern slavery’ and 
other forms of rightlessness, exploitation and domination, between the coercive 
power of physical violence and that of structural violence, between violence and 
constraints employed by private individuals and that employed by liberal democratic 
states, dominant discourse on ‘THB’ continues a tradition of ‘emancipation 
propaganda’ that supplies the symbolic vocabularies that ‘can be used by any 
powerful nation-state when it wishes to paint over the horrible things it has done in 
the brilliant brush strokes of the gift of freedom’ (Wood, 2010: x-xi). Stripped of the 
cant, the term ‘THB’ refers to those forms of movement and trade that are perceived 
to threaten state power, not to any and all traffic that leads to heavy restraints on 
human freedom, or that threatens life itself. Some anti-slavery and human rights 
activists wish to employ the vocabulary of ‘THB’ to more progressive ends. But until 
they challenge territorial states’ right to control the movement of people across their 
borders, and demand for all humankind the right to freely enter, as well as freely 
exit, any state’s territory, their efforts will inevitably be suborned to a tradition of 
liberal thought that condemns the exercise of violent control by private individuals 
but fails to question ‘the forms of violence and domination… licensed by the 
invocation of rights, and justified on the grounds of liberty and freedom’ (Hartman, 
1997: 6). 
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i The UN Trafficking Protocol defines trafficking as:  
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or 
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of 
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar 
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. 
The Protocol further provides that the consent of a VoT to the intended exploitation is irrelevant 
where any of the means set out above have been used.  
 
ii Space does not permit an analysis of the relationship between state actors and the broader 
network of activists and NGOs that promulgate the discourse of ‘trafficking as modern-day slavery’, 
but the ideological moorings of the contemporary anti-slavery movement, and the politics of ‘anti-
trafficking’ have been examined in some detail by Sharma (2003), Anderson and Andrijasevic (2008), 
Bernstein (2010), Chuang (2015), O’Connell Davidson (2015).  
 
